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On occasion, a decision by the United States Supreme Court in the
area of federal civil rights law invites a profound rethinking of rights,
remedies, and enforcement under federal law. Faced with such an
invitation, the federal authorities charged with civil rights enforcement
have often risen to the challenge and responded vigorously. For example,
in 1999, the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C. that the medically
unjustifiable institutionalization of persons with disabilities under publicly
administered programs constitutes discrimination under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.' The Court ordered that steps be taken toward
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community integration "at a reasonable pace., 2 Within days of the
decision, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) acknowledged the importance of the case in an unprecedented
letter to the nation's governors;' within months, federal involvement by the
Clinton Administration had dramatically expanded.4  The Secretary
instructed both the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS; then the Health Care Financing
Administration) to pursue active implementation strategies, which would
include the issuance of interpretive guidelines, technical assistance to aid
state compliance, expanded training of federal agency staff, and an
aggressive program of internal assessment to determine the extent to
which existing federal policies impeded community integration.' The
incoming Bush Administration continued this national focus on disability
rights through executive orders,6 assessments of the performance of
federal programs, and new initiatives to promote community integration
If the executive branch's follow-up to Olmstead stands out as a model of
responsiveness, its reaction to the recent Supreme Court ruling in
2. Id. at 605-06. See also Sara Rosenbaum, The Olmstead Decision: Implications for State
Health Policy, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 228. We note that Olmstead's implications for
private conduct relating to the provision of employer-sponsored health and disability
benefits are under review by various federal courts. See, e.g.,Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No.
99-14563, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24923 (1 1th Cir. Dec. 19, 2001), reh "granted, 273 F.3d
1035 (11th Cir. 2001).
3. Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, Center for Medicaid and State
Operations, Health Care Financing Administration, & Thomas Perez, Director, Office for
Civil Rights, to State Medicaid Directors (Jan. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/olmsO114.htm (last visited May 29, 2002).
4. From the time it was handed down, Olmnstead was understood to be of great moment
in the administration of public programs, as evidenced by the highly publicized reaction of
federal and state officials. See, e.g., Donna E. Shalala, Health Care Challenges for the New
Millennium, Address at the National Conference of State Legislators (Jul. 28, 1999),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/olmstead.htm (last visited May 29, 2002) (encouraging
state legislators to invest the "time. effort, creativity and commitment" required to
implement the Ohnstead decision).
5. Kathleen A. Maloy, Alexandra Stewart & Sara Rosenbaum, Beyond Olrnstead v. L.C.:
An Assessment of HHS/OCR's Efforts to Implement a Community Integration Goal (May
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (prepared for the HHS Office for
Civil Rights).
6. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 19, 2001), available at
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Alexander v. Sandoval is just the opposite-a model of inaction and neglect.
No case in recent memory has more urgently demanded the attention of
the officials charged with the administration of civil rights laws in the
context of federally funded programs. In Sandoval, a 5-4 majority held that
individuals who allege disparate impact (de facto) discrimination under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act),9 which outlaws
discrimination by programs receiving federal financial assistance, have no
private cause of action to enforce their rights.' Although Sandoval left
federal agencies with the exclusive province to enforce prohibitions against
disparate-impact discrimination under-Title VI, the response from HHS-
the key enforcement agency for federally assisted health and human
services programs-was virtual silence. ' A search of news articles reporting
on the decision failed to turn up a single statement from civil rights
officials regarding the expanded importance of federal oversight
obligations in the wake of Sandoval. 2 Similarly, the Bush Administration's
8. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, or national origin by programs and activities that receive federal financial
assistance ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.").
10. 532 U.S. at 293.
11. One noteworthy example of this silence is the Department of justice's revision of
policy guidance-since the time Sandovalwas handed down--concerning the prohibition
against national origin discrimination affecting persons with limited English proficiency
(LEP). See Notice of Republication, Policy Guidance on the Prohibition Against National
Origin Discrimination As It Affects Persons with Limited English Proficiency, 67 Fed. Reg.
4968 (Feb. 1, 2002). The revised guidance is notable for its utter lack of discussion in
Section VIII of Sandovats implications for the Department's civil rights enforcement
responsibilities. Moreover, the Department elsewhere asserts that compliance with its anti-
discrimination directive is purely voluntary. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting
Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,237 (Apr. 18, 2002), available at
http://wvw.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/lep/DOJLEPGuidAprl 22002.htrn (last visited May 29,
2002) (noting that "[t] he goal for Title V and Tile VI regulatory enforcement is to achieve
voluntary compliance").
12. According to a search of Lexis-Nexis databases, in the first three months following
the decisions, eighteen major newspapers ran Olnstead articles, while twenty ran Sandoval
stories. Of all news outlets, eighty-two articles discussed the Ohstead decision, compared
with eighty-five Sandoval stories. Nine months after each of the two rulings, again analyzing
all news outlets, 137 articles covered Ornslead, while 117 discussed SandovaL Putting aside
the apparent similar newsworthiness of the two decisions, it is worth noting that there has
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Fiscal Year 2003 budget request for civil rights enforcement in health care
(the first presidential budget proposal following the Sandoval decision)
contains no suggestion of the increased importance of federal civil rights
enforcement activities following the decision.
The failure of the federal government to respond vigorously to the
Sandoval decision, as it vigorously responded to Olnstead, threatens to
deepen a crisis of confidence regarding the willingness of society at large
to decisively address one of the most fundamental problems in United
States health policy-that of racial and ethnic discrimination." The federal
government's failure to respond to Sandoval grew more striking following
the Spring 2002 release of the Institute of Medicine's (10M) landmark
study Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health
Care." That study documented the pervasive nature of "racial or ethnic
differences in the quality of healthcare that are not due to access-related
factors or clinical needs, preferences and appropriateness of
intervention"' The IOM study goes to the heart of the problem, namely
the widespread and systemic discriminatory conduct within the United
States health care system that begins at the point of entry and continues
throughout the secondary and tertiary pathways of the system.' 7 It is
precisely this sort of systemic problem that Title VI was enacted to prevent.
This Article examines the Sandoval decision and its implications for
federal civil rights enforcement activities in the modern health care system.
Part I presents an overview of Title VI, examining the rights and
obligations it creates as well as its federal enforcement and oversight
been no suggestion we could find that the contrasting executive branch responses to
Sandoval and Olmstead stemmed from the fact that somehow the net effect of the two cases
in a health care context is different; both involve discrimination against a protected sub-
population for reasons wholly unrelated to the appropriateness of care.
13. Indeed, HHS/OCR's budget request sought an overall increase that roughly
approximated a nominal increase for inflation. See Office for Civil Rights, TY2003 Budget,
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/fi03budget.htinl (last visited May 29, 2002).
14. See discussion infra Part I.
15. INST. Or MED., UNEQUAL TREAl MENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES
IN HFALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT].
16. Id. at 4.
17. For evidence corroborating the IOM findings, see, for example, HENRYJ. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., KEY FAcTS: RACE, ETHNICr( AND MEDICAL CARE (1999); MOREHOUSE MED.
TREATMFNT EFFECTrVENESS CR., A SYNTIrEsIs OF THE LITERATIURE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DIFFERENCES INACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE (Robert M. Mayberry et al. eds., 1999); Kathryn A.
Phillips et al., Barriers to Care Among Racial/Ethnic Groups Under Managed Care, HEALTH AFF.,
july/Aug. 2000, at 65.
111:2 (2003)
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structure. We also briefly review the history of private litigation attempting
to enforce Title VI in a health care context. Part II examines the existing
federal administrative system for enforcing Tide VI and reviews evidence
regarding the HHS Office for Civil Rights's ability to enforce anti-
discrimination law. In Part III, we discuss Sandoval and examine the
Supreme Court's reasoning in departing from longstanding principles of
civil rights jurisprudence.
Finally, we argue in Part IV that regardless of whether Congress
reverses Sandoval through legislation, there is an enormous need for a
fundamental restructuring of federal civil rights oversight activities. With
federal spending dominating a health system that is growing ever more
complex, there is a compelling need to unequivocally grant civil rights
enforcement responsibilities to the federal agencies with the power to
make expenditure decisions. These agencies should not only investigate
and sanction, but also set the standards for the entities that they oversee.
This structural change is particularly important given that these agencies
control the distribution of hundreds of billions of dollars to public and
private entities ranging from state and local government agencies to the
nation's leading teaching hospitals, research and training programs, and
health care corporations.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VI AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,' of which Title VI is a part, was a critical
development in the evolution of American social policy. The Act created a
broad remedial structure to end discrimination in employment, places of
public accommodation, and programs and activities (including health care
providers and programs) that receive federal financial assistance."" Because
it derives from Congress' powers under the Spending Clause of the
Constitution, 2 Title VI does not reach purely private conduct, such as the
18. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994)).
19. Nearly thirty years after passage of the 1964 Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 would classify private health care providers as places of public accommodation, a
step that signaled a profound evolution in societal expectations of the health system and its
basic accountability. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1990); Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. We note parenthetically that Spending Clause
legislation, including Title VI, is critical to the preservation and protection of civil rights
given the current Supreme Court's inclination to strike down on federalism grounds
congressional pronouncements based on the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Indeed, "lit] he Spending Clause is
5
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activities of health professionals who do not directly participate in
government insurance programs.2' But the reach of federal funding in the
U.S. health care system is so enormous that very little of the modern health
care enterprise lies beyond the scope of Title VI.
22
The legislative history of Title VI indicates that health care was
prominent in the minds of its authors. The history also reveals that all
forms of discrimination in health care-both deliberate acts of
discrimination and conduct that unintentionally results in harm to racial
minorities-were a driving force behind the law's enactment.3
Moreover, passage of the 1964 Act was contemporaneous with the
judicial ruling in Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,24 which found
unconstitutional a key portion of the Hospital Survey and Construction Act
of 1946 (known as the Hill-Burton Act),25 which had authorized the use of
federal funds to construct and operate segregated health care facilities."
With the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid the following year, the
federal government's power to use federal financial participation to force
an end to discriminatory treatment was seemingly limitless. -7
In this Part, we first review key terms under Title VI with an emphasis
perhaps the clearest method of avoiding constitutional challenges to congressional acts
under the Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment." Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of
Federalism AfterU.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV.J. ONLEGIS. 525, 553 (1997)
(footnotes omitted). It is for this reason that scholars have advocated that Congress use its
spending power to expand the scope of its civil rights enforcement power. See, e.g., Daniel
0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role
of Congress in Protecting Religious F'eedom fom State and Local Infingement, 20 U. Ark Little
Rock L.J. 633, 668 (1998).
21. See Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigarating Title I,: Defending Health Care Discrimination-It
Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDIAM L. REV. 939, 944 (1990).
22. Thomas E. Perez, The Civil Rights Dimensions of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health
Care, in UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 15, at 362-90.
23. Cr7L RiGrrs Div., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTiE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANuAL (2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.ht (last visited July 5, 2003); DA VID
BAwrON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION (1999).
24. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
25. Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3(a), 78 Stat. 447 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291.
(2003)).
26. SMITH, supra note 23, at 101-03.
27. Indeed, as David Barton Smith, supra note 23, recounts in his exceptional book
detailing the history of this counti y's racially divided health care system, so powerful was the
nexus between Title VI and Medicare that the existence of Title VI threatened Medicare's
passage because of opposition by some Southern senators to such a huge expansion of civil
rights authority into the health system. Id.
111:2([2003)
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on their application to health care. We then describe the mechanisms for
public enforcement of Title VI. Finally, we examine private enforcement
under Title VI.
A. Key Terms in Title V/
The provisions of Title VI prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin by programs and activities that receive federal
financial assistance. Section 601 of the Act provides that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance." Section 602 "authorize[s] and direct[s]" federal agencies to
"effectuate the provisions of section 601" by promulgating and enforcing
"rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability. 29 The law thus
imposes on federal agencies a duty to act, not merely the discretion to do
so. As a result, federal regulations set forth an administrative enforcement
mechanism that authorizes federal agencies to set non-discrimination
standards, investigate claims of discrimination, and terminate federal
assistance to any entity that is found to have violated the law."
The term "discrimination" is not defined in Title VI; under the statute,
each federal agency that oversees programs of federal financial assistance
must promulgate regulatory standards-which would include a definition
of discrimination-to enforce the law. Early efforts to produce a common
set of standards regarding discrimination across all federal agencies
offering federal financial assistance led to a series of twenty-two sets of
rules that stemmed from a model initially developed for the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (the predecessor agency to
HHS) ." The rules, which remain in force and virtually unchanged, extend
beyond acts of intentional discrimination and reach conduct and practices
that, even if facially neutral, have a disproportionate adverse impact on
members of minority groups. In the case of health and human services,
federal regulations use in part the following broad language to identify
prohibited activities:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other
28. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2003)).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
30. 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.101-412 (2001); see aLso Guidelines for the Enforcement of Title VI,
28 C.F.R. § 50.3 (2001).
31. Watson, su'pra note 21, at 947-48.
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benefits, or facilities which will be provided under any such program, or
the class of individuals to whom, or the situations in which, such services,
financial aid, other benefits, or facilities will be provided under any such
program, or the class of individuals to be afforded an opportunity to
participate in any such program, may not, directly or through contractual
or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.n
These standards were designed to target relevant conduct while still
being sufficiently flexible to retain their force over time.3 For example, in
their prohibition of discrimination either directly or through contractual
arrangements, the regulations would appear to apply not only to
traditional health care entities such as hospitals, nursing homes, and other
"brick and mortar" institutions, but also to modern managed care entitles
that function as insuring internediaries with contractually networked
providers."5 Despite the vast changes in the U.S. health system that have
occurred since the promulgation of these regulations, it is evident that
they retain sufficient vigor to reach all types of federally assisted agencies
and entities operating directly or by contract, regardless of whether they
are housed in single facilities or scattered across a community through far-
flung service networks.
Because the American health care system is overwhelmingly privately
owned and operated, it is essential in a discussion of Title VI to understand
the meaning of the terms "federal financial assistance," "recipient," and
"program or activity." The Department of Justice explains that "federal
financial assistance includes more than money" and may include such
benefits as the use of federal land and the lending of federal personnel.'
Federal financial assistance does not include contracts of guarantee or
insurance, or direct payments to individuals, but the term does include
contracts that have as a purpose the provision of federal financial
assistance.'7 For example, a contract between a state Medicaid program and
32. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (2) (2001) (emphasis added).
33, Watson, supra note 21, at 947.
34. See. e.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980).
35. See RAND E. RosrNBIAT ET AL., LAW ±ANrD THE AMERIcAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 584
(1997).
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a managed care organization to serve Medicaid beneficiaries may be
covered by Title VI.3" Other examples include federal payments to
Medicare+Choice managed care organizations, payments to health
professions teaching programs, and federal research grants.
Beyond the breadth of the term "federal financial assistance," the
reach of Title VI is further expanded because of the related concepts of
"recipient" and "program or activity." The Justice Department notes that
under federal rules a "recipient" can be "any State, political subdivision of
any State, or instrumentality of any State or political subdivision."" The
term "recipient" also covers "any public or private agency, institution, or
organization, or other entity ...to whom federal financial assistance is
extended.. . " The concept of "program or activity" has been interpreted
broadly as well so that it subjects an entire entity to Title VI, not merely the
portion that receives federal financial assistance. Thus, for example,
federal student loan payments to a university are sufficient to establish a
nexus between Title VI and all university operations, not merely those
activities specifically undertaken with, or in furtherance of, the student
loan program. In other words, the presence of federal program
beneficiaries within a larger enterprise that also serves private-pay
individuals is sufficient to subject the entire enterprise to federal anti-
discrimination law. The underlying theory of this interpretation of the law,
reinforced by Congress in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 4 is that
when federal funds flow to a large enterprise, the funds help support the
entire enterprise, not merely a specific element.
It was not an accident in the history of Title VI that Medicare payments
to private physicians are not considered as federal financial participation.
In his excellent history of Title VI and its enforcement in a health care
context, David Barton Smith notes that, in the face of Southern opposition
to the application of Title VI to Medicare, the Johnson Administration, in
order to secure Medicare's enactment, effectively promised to exempt
physicians from Title VI enforcement actions by classifying Medicare Part B
payments as direct assistance to individuals, rather than as federal financial
38. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Srvcs., Fact Sheet, Your Rights
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, available at http:/wv.dhhs.gov/ocr/title6.html
(last visited May 29, 2002) (noting that Medicare and Medicaid may be programs covered
by Title VI).
39. 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(f) (2001); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 23, at 20.
40. 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(f) (2001).
41. CIVIL RIGHTS Div., supra note 23, at 25.
42. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
88 (1994)).
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assistance to physicians.43 This promise effectively eliminated a principal
basis of Title VI jurisdiction over the conduct of private physicians. The
logic of this position flowed from Medicare's original structure as, by and
large, an indemnifier of individual patients for payments made to private
physicians for covered services. Medicare's evolution has, of course,
eclipsed this original model; today, physicians overwhelmingly receive
Medicare payments directly, and in its 2000 Limited English Proficiency
guidelines, OCR classified Medicare payments as a form of federal
financial assistance, suggesting an end to this longstanding policy of
exemption for physicians.4
B. Public Enforcement of Title VJ
Given the broad scope of Title VI, administrative agencies have
developed mechanisms to enforce compliance with Title VI's terms. In this
Section, we describe these mechanisms. In Part II, we embark upon a more
focused look at the enforcement mechanisms specific to the health care
context in an effort to expose their deficiencies.
An individual who chooses to use Title VI's administrative
enforcement machinery begins the process by filing an administrative
complaint with the appropriate federal agency.4' Where federal health
programs are at issue, this agency is the HHS Office for Civil Rights
(OCR), which, under the organizational rules of the Department, is
granted authority to investigate violations of civil rights law. Federal rules
provide that an agency "will make a prompt investigation whenever a...
complaint . . . indicates a possible failure to comply with [Title VI
requirements] . If an official investigation indicates a failure to comply,
"the responsible Department official... will so inform the recipient and
the matter will be resolved by informal means whenever possible."4' If the
agency determines that the matter cannot be resolved informally, then
judicial action "will be taken."48 On the other hand, if the official
investigation concludes that no action is warranted, the agency must
inform the complainant and recipient of this result"
43. SMIrH, sul-a note 23, at 115-28.
44. Policy Guidance on the Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination
As It Affects Persons With Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,762 (Aug. 30, 2000).
45. 28 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) (2001).
46. Id. §42.107(c).
47. Id. § 42.107(d)(1).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 42.107(d) (2).
111:2 (2003)
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The power assigned to federal agencies under Title VI extends beyond
the task of investigating individual complaints. Under the express terms of
Section 602, this power includes the authority (if not a legally enforceable
public duty) ' to set rules of general applicability that provide recipients of
federal financial assistance with standards for achieving compliance under
the law. Under both the Act and normal principles of administrative law,
federal agencies have the discretion to promulgate generally applicable
rules of conduct that define the obligations and duties of recipients of
federal financial assistance. To bolster their enforcement power, federal
agencies require that all recipients of federal financial assistance file
assurances of compliance with the terms of Tide V1.5'
Title VI administrative enforcement procedures thus vest federal
agencies with considerable discretion to design, implement, and evaluate
civil rights enforcement standards and procedures, with duties ranging
from issuing policies to investigating specific incidents. -
C. Private Enforcement of Title VI
Like much of the legislation of its time, Title VI was silent on the issue
of whether private individuals who had suffered discrimination by covered
entities could bring lawsuits to enforce their rights under the law.
However, until the Sandoval decision, many federal courts had inferred a
private right of action under the law to enforce the legal protections
contained in both the statute itself and its implementing regulations."' The
50. Of course, whether individual claimants could actually enforce this duty is another
matter. For example, in Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121 (6th Cir. 1996), plaintiffs
were unsuccessful in a suit against the federal government in which they sought to compel
the government to include queries as to the race and ethnic identity of patients on a
standard billing form used by health care institutions seeking reimbursement from federally
sponsored health programs.
51. 28 C.FR. § 42.105(a) (2001).
52. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has extensively described the scope
of this discretion in its 1999 study of discrimination in health care. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTs, THE HEALi-TH CARE CHALLENGE: ACKNOWLEDGING DISPARTY, CONFRONTING
DISCRMUINATION, AND ENSuRiNG EQuALrY 17-49 (1999). The report is discussed in/ia Part I1.
53. Indeed, every federal Court of Appeals to address the question prior to Sandoval
concluded that a private right of action exists to enforce the rights guaranteed both by the
text of Title VI and by any regulations validly promulgated pursuant to that Title. See, e.g.,
Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 1999); Ferguson v. Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th
Cir. 1999), rev'd on othurgrounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th
Cir. 1999); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936-37
(3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5
11
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distinction between protections found in the statute and those created by
regulations is important because the two reach distinct types of conduct.
The statute prohibits disparate treatment, which encompasses claims of
intentional discrimination. A disparate treatment claim requires proof of
motive, which can be inferred from circumstances surrounding the
defendant's conduct (for example, requiring all African-American or
Latino patients to prepay certain tests or procedures that otherwise are
furnished to patients on a "bill later" basis).
The second type of conduct, prohibited by the regulations
implementing Title VI and termed "disproportionate adverse impact"
discrimination, is the sort at issue in the Sandoval case. It focuses on
conduct that is facially neutral but falls more heavily on members of
minority groups and cannot be justified by the defendant.54 Claims of this
type involve allegations that a recipient of federal financial assistance, "in
violation of federal regulations," has used a "neutral procedure or
practice" that has a "disparate impact on protected individuals, and such
practice lack[ed] a substantial legitimate justification."" In a disparate
impact case, the focus is thus on the consequences of the conduct, rather
than the recipient's intent.
As with other laws that proscribe certain conduct, Title VI
enforcement turns on the basic elements of the claim, the permissible
defenses, and the allocation of the burden of proof between the parties.
Because Title VI and its regulations outlaw both intentional discrimination
and facially neutral conduct having a disproportionate adverse impact, the
defenses and burdens of enforcement depend on the nature of the claim.-"
Title VI health care cases have never been particularly common, nor
particularly successful. Numerous reviews of the use of Title VI in health
care discrimination cases have offered the same explanation: the manner
in which burdens are allocated under Title VI litigation and the difficulty
(6th Cir. 1996); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996); New York Urban
League, Inc. v. NewYork, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d
1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988); Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799
F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (lst Cir. 1986); Castanedav. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465 n.ll (5th Cir.
1986); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1986).
54. Watson, supra note 21, at 948-49; Cmvu RiGHTS DIV., supra note 23, at 34.
55. CiviL RIGHTS Div., supra note 23, at 34.
56. See generally Daniel Hampton, Title /I Challenges by Private Parties to the Location of
Health Care Facilities: Toward a just and Effective Action, 37 B.C. L. REV. 517 (1996); Sara
Rosenbaum et al., U.S. Civil Rights Policy and Access to Health Care by Minority Ameicans:
Implicationsfor a Changing Health Care System, 57 MED. CARF REs. & REV. 236 (2000).
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plaintiffs face in meeting the burdens. 7
In disparate treatment claims (i.e., claims of intentional
discrimination), "smoking gun" evidence of discriminatory motive is rare,
so plaintiffs typically rely on circumstantial evidence. Disparate treatment
cases often involve a "three-step proof model" that focuses on
"circumstantial evidence in an effort to uncover the defendant's true
motive."" The three steps are the plaintiffs presentation of prima facie
evidence that discrimination exists, the defendant's rebuttal of the
evidence based on any legitimate reason for its existence, and finally the
plaintiffs attempt to prove that the defendant's proffered basis is but a
pretext cloaking a discriminatory motive. As with other state-of-mind
offenses, proving motive (and therefore prevailing as a plaintiff) is
extremely difficult.
In disproportionate adverse impact cases, the impact of the conduct
and not the motive is at issue, and the goal is to identify and remove
barriers that unnecessarily produce disproportionate adverse results for a
protected minority group.5i Again, there is a three-step test. The first step
resembles that in a disproportionate treatment claim: A plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case through statistical evidence that a facially neutral barrier
has a disproportionate impact on a protected group. In health care,
examples of these barriers include a defendant hospital's decision to place
a limit on its number of Medicaid beds, to relocate its facilities to a
wealthier neighborhood,61 or to refuse to participate in the Medicaid
program altogether." The defendant then has the burden of justifying the
alleged discriminatory practice by arguing that it serves a legitimate goal.
For example, in a non-participation case, a defendant might show that
Medicaid rates are so low in relation to the cost and financial risks of
patient care that participation would generate significant financial losses
for the institution. In a relocation case, the defendant might show that a
57. See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 56; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 56; Watson, supra
note 21.
58. Watson, supra note 21, at 956.
59. Watson, supra note 21. In a health care context, examples of such barriers include
using patient co-payments as a condition of receiving treatment, or designing physician
office hours based on patient insurance status (e.g., by only permitting Medicaid
beneficiaries access to a physician's office on particular days of the week or during
particular times during the day).
60. See, e.g., Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
61. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v.
Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
62. See, e.g., Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970).
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move was necessary as a response to a basic shift in the institution's
essential economic base. Similarly, a decision to close clinics in a poor
neighborhood as part of a move might be defended as necessary to
improve revenues and achieve greater operational efficiency.1
3
If the defendant makes the requisite showing of legitimate purpose,
the plaintiff may rebut this defense by demonstrating a plausible
alternative policy with less adverse disparate impact. While demonstrating
the feasibility of a less adverse alternative is not as difficult as proving
motive and pretext in a disparate treatment case, the burden on the
plaintiff remains very steep. Since plaintiffs lack the business and
marketing knowledge relevant to assessing defendants' choices, placing the
burden of ascertaining the range of options on the plaintiff creates an
enormous obstacle. This is particularly true in the case of private health
care enterprises, where the responsibility to show the existence of realistic
business alternatives requires a highly sophisticated analysis of business
practices and access to huge amounts of data specific to the defendant's
business.
To allow a recipient of federal assistance to defend de facto
discriminatory practices as simply furthering a "legitimate" business goal
(for example, the all-purpose legitimate goal of making an acceptable
return on investment) means that plaintiffs are effectively placed in the
position of having to contest the basic assumptions of the enterprise itself.
In the absence of federal standards that describe a range of legitimate
approaches and require conformity as a condition of federal funding, the
courts have in effect assigned to private plaintiffs the task of second-
guessing business decisions even though they lack access to the evidence
needed to complete this task.6
4
63. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp.,
319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970).
64. There is one example of an enforcement approach that involves the setting of
prospective standards identifying the range of legitimate responses by federal recipients to
their federal duties under Title VI. In 2000, the Health and Human Services Office for Civil
Rights issued limited English proficiency guidelines that provided relatively detailed
instructions to recipients of federal financial assistance (including agencies and health
institutions) regarding approaches to compliance. Nondiscrimination Under Programs
Receiving Federal Assistance Through the Department of Health and Human Services;
Effectuation of Title Vt of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. pt. 80 (2000). The
guidelines were immediately and aggressively challenged by a broad coalition of provider
organizations and associations, but have remained in effect nonetheless. In its effort to both
identify a major activity (i.e., the availability of services in a language other than English) on
the part of federal financial assistance recipients and describe the range of responses to this
111:2 (2003)
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Plaintiffs in the few Title VI health care cases that have been litigated
over the years have tended not to fare well.65 In cases in which a plaintiff
has been able to prove discriminatory impact on the basis of practices
aimed at minority and non-minority patients receiving health care in the
same geographic market, there have been victories. Thus, for example,
separating hospital beds on the basis of insurance status or program in the
same facility, or limiting the number of Medicaid beds in a single nursing
facility, might amount to a successful case, since within the same service
area there is an identifiable practice (i.e., separating patients by payer
source) that has a disproportionate adverse impact on protected
individuals. Yet even here it might be possible for a defendant to show a
legitimate business reason for the practice.6
In cases involving market relocation or avoidance, plaintiffs have
generally lost. 7 It is difficult to contest a defendant's decision to move
because of underlying socioeconomic changes and shifts in
neighborhoods; similarly, it is very difficult to force a business to relocate
to a money-losing market. In health care, this mixing of financial
opportunities with discrimination is complicated by the fact that minority
patients disproportionately are uninsured or rely on Medicaid, a
notoriously poor health care payer.'8 Were Medicaid a good payer, a
decision to move away from or avoid serving Medicaid patients might be
questioned. But where Medicaid pays poorly, the need to avoid financial
loss arguably leaves defendants no alternative but to flee the market or
shift costs onto other payers, which is hardly a sound business practice.
For all of the reasons discussed, particularly the heavy burdens
plaintiffs face in making their cases, private enforcement of Title Vi is
extremely difficult. We now discuss whether public enforcement of civil
rights law in the health care setting has met with greater success.
duty that would be considered acceptable, OCR attempted to do what individual plaintiffs
in civil rights actions cannot do, namely, underscore the availability of options for
conducting business that are calculated to minimize adverse impacts. This example of
proactive guidance from the government stands in stark contrast to the basic record of
inaction.
65. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 56; Watson, supra note 21.
66. Perez, supra note 22.
67. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 56.
68. See Stephen Norton & Stephen Zuckerman, Trends in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1993-
1998, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2000, at 222.
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II. THE CHALLENGE OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI
In this Part, we examine the scope and power of governmental
enforcement by providing a brief review of where matters stood vis-a-vis
Title VI enforcement at the time Sandoval was handed down.
In 1999-two years before the Supreme Court decided Sandoval-the
United States Commission on Civil Rights (the Commission or USCCR)
issued the results of a lengthy examination of U.S. civil rights enforcement
in the area of health care69 The Commission was extremely harsh in
describing the depths to which OCR had sunk by the end of the twentieth
century. The Commission concluded that "the timid and ineffectual
enforcement efforts of [OCR] have fostered, rather than combated, the
discrimination that continues to infect the Nation's health care system.
This is evident in the segregation, disparate treatment, and racism
experienced by African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, and members of other minority
,,70groups...
The Commission was careful not to assign all the blame for
discriminatory conditions to OCR.;' It pointed out that since government-
sanctioned segregation was abolished in the aftermath of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act-and with it the most visible forms of discrimination-racial
inequality in health care had never been a top national priority. As such, it
found that civil rights enforcement was afforded relatively little emphasisS - 72
and was not seen as an integral part of HHS's mission. Similarly, the
Commission determined that Congress and successive Presidents had
essentially ignored OCR, failing to prioritize health care civil rights
enforcement or offer any oversight or support. For example, as of 1999,
Congress had not held an oversight hearing on OCR's civil rights
enforcement activities since 1987.?s Consequently, OCR was found to suffer
from both a lack of guidance and severe resource constraints, thus
69. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52. The Commission is an independent,
bipartisan agency first established by Congress in 1957. Its investigation of civil rights
enforcement efforts by HHS was undertaken pursuant to Public Law 103-419 (1994), which,
in part, reauthorized the Commission and directed it to study, collect information relating
to, and make appraisals of federal laws and policies regarding discrimination or denials of
equal protection of the laws. Until the 1999 report, the Commission had not conducted a
comprehensive evaluation of HHS. 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGI-TS, supra note 52, at iii.
70. Id. at 274.
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impeding competent implementation of its civil rights enforcement
responsibilities. In 1999, OCR's budget represented just 0.0054 percent of
the entire HHS budget, and OCR had no separate budget for Title VI
enforcement. 4 Between 1980 and the date of the report, the number of
full-time OCR employees had dropped by some sixty percenti 5
At the same time, and even more striking in the context of Sandoval,
the Commission laid considerable blame at OCR's feet. Even with lower
expectations in light of limited resources, the Commission found that OCR
showed shameful neglect of its responsibilities."5 Most frustrating to the
Commission was OCR's unwillingness to address or attack its deficiencies,
choosing instead to act sluggishly and unresponsively to increasing racial
inequalities in health care. The Commission found that OCR had
developed no Title VI guidelines and few policy directives, that it lacked a
thorough pre-award review process to ensure that prospective recipients of
federal financial assistance were in compliance with the law, that it rarely
conducted post-award desk audit reviews and comprehensive onsite
compliance reviews, that it had a growing complaint backlog, and that it
lacked an effective and comprehensive system for monitoring corrective
action commitments. 77 In other words, OCR was utterly incapable of doing
its job.
The Commission also described many concerns with OCR's complaint
investigation process. It found OCR regulations for complaint evaluation
vague and overly broad, offering little or no guidance for employees."
Furthermore, OCR was found to lack thorough and rigorous investigative
techniques and methodologies, particularly in ascertaining the difference
in quality of health care provided across racial and ethnic lines.7 Of
particular concern in light of Sandova, OCR staff had no clear policy
guidance on how to conduct disparate impact analyses, and was generally
unable to identify a "nexus" between existing disparities and a health care
practice or policy.80
OCR was also found to sometimes demonstrate inattention to or
ignorance of Title VI issues. The Commission recounted one incident in
which OCR became involved in a Title VI disparate impact case entitled
74. Id. at 292-93.
75. Id. at 27.
76. See id. at 276.
77. See id. at 240-45.
78. Id. at 173.
79. Id. at 184.
80. Id. at 184-85.
17
Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum: Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
Mussington v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center." At a community meeting
about the case, one participant indicated that the hospital might have
discriminated against Medicaid patients. Amazingly, the OCR investigator
informed the audience that such discrimination was not illegal, according
to an NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney present at the meeting. 2
From the Commission's viewpoint, however, perhaps the most
distressing problem (and without doubt the most extraordinary of all the
facts available to the Supreme Court at the time it decided Sandoval) is
OCR's inability to effectively address and resolve complaints filed by
alleged victims of race discrimination. Individuals who believe that they
have been discriminated against on the basis of race, color, or national
origin are entitled under federal regulations to file a complaint with OCR.
Title VI regulations require OCR to establish procedures for the "prompt
processing and disposition" of all complaints of discriminatory practices.
3
Yet despite this mandate, USCCR found that OCR "takes inordinate
amounts of time to complete complaint investigations,," with complaint
files often open for three to six years. USSCR warned that,
[u]nlike the civil rights enforcement agencies that address discrimination
in education and employment, OCR is responsible for uncovering
discrimination that may affect not just one's life opportunities but on
[sic] something far more profound-individuals' health and physical
well-being. In some cases, prompt investigation could be a matter of life
and death 5
This recounting of the inner workings of OCR illustrates a few basic
points. First, the Commission's description of the agency's funding and
staffing difficulties suggests that the dreadful financial and operational
conditions within OCR are a fixture on the landscape of government
enforcement and not a recent development. As Smith notes in his history
of Title VI, the very establishment of OCR as an agency separate from the
agencies directly administering federally financed programs amounted to a
deliberate attempt on the part of some members of Congress (in
particular, powerful members of the appropriations committees) to
eviscerate civil rights enforcement efforts. 5 This separation of agencies was
81. 824 F. Supp. 427 (S.DN.Y. 1993), affd, 18 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994).
82. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIViL RIGHTS, s818p note 52, at 190.
83. 28 C.F.R. § 42.408(a) (2001).
84. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIL RiH(;Hs, supra note 52, at 189.
85. Id.
86. SMirH, supra note 23, at 164-66.
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a direct response to active efforts by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to achieve civil rights compliance within the health care
industry in the wake of Medicare's enactmentY8 Over time, the decision to
centralize civil rights operations and remove civil rights enforcement from
day-to-day program administration has had precisely its intended effect.
Second, to the extent that anyone expects that a renewed commitment
to active government intervention in the face of health care inequality
could occur through OCR, the Commission's analysis of the agency's
structure and capability should dash this expectation. There are no
standards of conduct in the area of health care-one of the largest sectors
of the U.S. economy'8--other than a handful of broadly crafted regulations
that are nearly forty years old and a very small amount of informal policy
guidance, even though OCR has the authority to craft specific standards.""
There is no system for measuring the presence of discrimination. And
there is no systematic enforcement strategy that could withstand most
defenses raised by a recipient of federal financial assistance, particularly in
light of the broad nature of the affirmative "legitimacy" defense. Under
this defense, a defendant could show in defacto cases (both those brought
by private litigants and by OCR) that even high levels of segregation and
unequal treatment stem from a legitimate business need."
But beyond the obvious need to maintain an office for civil rights that
is not a positive embarrassment, a perhaps deeper question concerns the
limits of what could be accomplished through a reinvigorated Title VI
standard-setting and enforcement machinery, if such machinery were
housed within OCR. The fact is that, even were OCR to be significantly
expanded in size and resources, the agency still would be understood as
having no real power over the thousands of basic, day-to-day decisions
regarding the standards of performance that federally assisted entities
must meet. Because OCR has never been given the formal task of
administering federal funding programs (in the way, for example, that the
HHS Health Resources and Services Administration administers the
Community Health Center Program or CMS administers the Medicare
87. Id. For a similar view and excellent treatment of the need for litigation to address
racial and ethnic disparities in health care, see Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished
Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights Litigation to Address Race Discrimination and Inequalities in
Health Care Delivery, 6 Tx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2001).
88. Health care spending accounts for 14% of the United States's gross domestic
product. Lado, supra note 87, at 10.
89. See, for example, the regulations regarding limited English proficiency, supra note
11; supra text accompanying note 44.
90. See Watson, supra note 21, at 962,
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Program), its pronouncements over their standards of performance are
understandably perceived as having only limited meaning. Furthermore,
having worked closely with OCR officials over the years, it is our sense that
many of them believe that even if the agency were given the personnel and
resources to actively enforce its modest collection of standards in the
health care arena, its activities would continue to be viewed as somehow
separate and apart from the basic standards of performance guiding health
spending, not only by the entities that receive federal funds, but by the
sister agencies that administer the programs as well.
This sense of futility is underscored by a perusal of the thousands of
pages of federal regulations applicable to federal health care financing
programs. For example, although Title VI compliance is a condition of
federal funding, this simple fact is not stated anywhere in federal
regulations governing Medicare's conditions of participation. To offer one
illustration, the Medicare conditions of participation for hospitals open
with a threshold regulation that obligates participating facilities to be in
compliance with "federal laws related to the health and safety of patients."' 1
The fact that, in order to receive any federal funds, hospitals as a first
matter must be in compliance with federal laws related to the equal
treatment of patients regardless of race or national origin goes
unmentioned. Even the Medicare regulation that establishes hospitals'
legal obligation to honor "patients' rights" fails to make any mention of the
right to equal treatment regardless of race or national origin.92
The same marked absence of any indication of the obligation to be in
compliance with Title VI-or what that obligation means in a health care
context-is evident throughout the hundreds of pages of Medicare
conditions-of-participation regulations applicable to all forms of health
care providers and entities. 3 Nor do the rules require that the entity attest
to its compliance with Title Vi at the time that it makes a claim for
payment.
94
Time and again, recipients of federal financial assistance issue policies
that appear facially neutral (i.e., they make no mention of racial
identification) but are capable of producing devastating racial effects. The
91. 42 C.F.R. § 482.11 (2002).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13 (2002).
93. See, e.g., Requirements Relating to Health Insurance Coverage, General Provisions,
45 C.F.R. § 114.103 (2002); Requirements Relating to Access and Renewability of Coverage,
45 C.F.R. § 146.113 (2002); Requirements for the Group Health Insurance Market,
Exclusion of Plans and Enforcement Requirements, 45 C.F.R. § 146.180 (2002).
94. 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.30. (2002).
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selection of markets is a clear area of concern, as the past two decades of
litigation related to hospital closures and relocation underscore."5 Yet in
2001, and with no discussion of the potential disproportionate effects on
minority beneficiaries, the Bush Administration announced a new policy
that would permit Medicare+Choice organizations to identify their service
areas on a sub-county basisi 6 This policy, while clearly linked to an effort to
hold on to a declining market, also appears to explicitly sanction redlining
of racially identifiable portions of a community in favor of healthier and
more affluent residents. The notion that race is linked to poor health and
high cost is deeply embedded in the insurance industry despite years of
efforts to prohibit racial profiling.
97
Most striking perhaps from the standpoint of the modern health care
system is the absence of any reference to the basic obligation to abide by
Title VI regulations in the rules governing the sub-contractual
arrangements maintained by covered entities such as hospitals, nursing
homes, managed care organizations and other corporate health care
providers. As noted previously, Title VI regulations reach not only entities
but their contractors as well. This reach has become even more important
in light of the formation of ever more complex corporate health care
entities held together through a cascade of interlocking contracts. The
absence of clear prohibitions within the Medicare rules against contracts
with business partners that discriminate is striking. This is true not only
because it is a specific standard that is directly compelled by basic civil
rights law, but also because of the level of awareness within HHS today of
the extent to which covered entities can use contracts with otherwise
uncovered actors to avoid the purposes and intent of a federal law."
The same observations can be made about federal rules governing
Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).
The fact that compliance with Title VI is a basic condition of participation
for any state agency, program, or health care provider receiving federal
funding under these programs is simply absent from federal rules. Even
95. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); NAACP v. Wilmington
Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980).
96. Hans R. Dutt et al., The Financial Implications of HMOs'Partial County Carve-Out
Option, 14 MANAGED CARE INTERFACE 46 (2001).
97. Deborah A. Stone, The Strugglefir the Soul of Health Insurance, 18J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y& L. 287 (1993).
98. In fact, this theme of binding the contractual business partners of a covered
enterprise has dominated the federal government's health care privacy rules. See Standards
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 14,776 (proposed
March 27, 2002).
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worse, in the case of Medicaid there are situations in which CMS has
actively condoned the segregation of Medicaid beneficiaries-who are of
course disproportionately minority-into separate systems of care within a
single health care enterprise.
The federal regulations governing the SCHIP program illustrate a
broader failure on the part of federal agencies to think through the racial
implications of federal spending standards. Generally speaking, SCHIP
gives participating states two basic administration options. A participating
state may elect to implement SCHIP as an extension of its Medicaid
program, or it may cover some or all SCHIP-eligible children through a
separate state plan with its own distinct eligibility, benefit, provider-
participation, and other requirements. As of the end of 2001,
approximately two-thirds of all states administered their SCHIP programs
separately either in whole or in part (e.g., extending Medicaid coverage up
to the federal poverty level for all children under 18 and enrolling near-
poor children in a separate program).
The demographics of childhood poverty mean that in many states'and
communities, the poorest children (i.e., Medicaid children) are more
likely to be minority children while the near-poor children (those
potentially covered by SCHIP) are more likely to be non-minority.
Whatever their race, children have the potential to move between the two
programs as their family income fluctuates from year to year. Given the
fluctuation in income that characterizes many low-income households, and
the importance of continuity in pediatric care, one would imagine that, for
both the prevention of bias in provider participation and the promotion of
health quality, CMS would have addressed the issue of state contracting
practices with health care providers and entities. In fact, the regulations
are completely silent on the issue of whether a state agency can enter into
agreements under its separate SCHIP program with entities that refuse to
participate in Medicaid. The regulations do not even require states to be
able to demonstrate that they have in place a series of standards and
incentives to promote dual participation or discourage non-participation
in Medicaid.
The most egregious example of rules that foment discrimination is a
proposed rule, issued by the Bush Administration in August 2001, 9 that
would reverse an earlier Medicaid managed care rule promulgated by the
Clinton Administration. The earlier rule prohibited state agencies from
99. Medicaid Program; Medicaid Managed Care, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,614 (proposed Aug.
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maintaining contracts with Medicaid managed care organizations and
entities that maintained segregated provider networks (i.e., separate
networks based on source of payment). The intent of this earlier rule was
to prevent participating entities from excluding members from certain
portions of their network (and at least by logical extension, as a means of
discouraging managed care entities from contracting with health providers
that refuse to treat Medicaid patients). This type of exclusionary and
segregating practice bears striking similarities to the older and well-
documented practices involving segregated hospital floors, segregated
medical staffs, and segregated nursing home wings, all of which
unquestioningly violate Title VI. Without explanation, the 2001 regulation
proposed to simply eliminate the prohibition.
Similarly, the Clinton Administration's final Medicaid managed care
regulations sought to address the problem of language and culture access
in managed care by requiring participating entities in federal health
programs to be able to demonstrate the existence of various approaches to
cultural competency. 00 Yet the Bush Administration's 2002 Final Rule
eliminated these relatively precise requirements in favor of virtually no
standards other than a vague reference to cultural competence.0" As with
the segregated networks rle, this change was proposed with virtually no
explanation in the Preamble to the proposal. 2
A final example of the extent to which federal participation and
payment rules ignore or even undermine Title VI obligations can be found
in Medicaid rules applicable to provider payment. As a matter of federal
law, a state Medicaid program must maintain provider payment levels that
are sufficient to ensure reasonable access by beneficiaries, with the
reasonableness of the access measured in terms of access to the same
services by comparable populations.0 3 The federal Medicaid equal-access
regulations arguably have two statutory bases: the federal Medicaid statute
that sets the standard, and Title VI, which reinforces these regulations
because of Medicaid's disproportionate minority racial and ethnic
composition. Despite the fact that inadequate beneficiary access to health
providers is epidemic and the subject of widespread discussion,10 ' CMS has
100. 42 C.F.R. § 438.10 (2000).
101. Medicaid Program; Medicaid Managed Care, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,989, 41,106 (June 14,
2002), codified at 42 C.F.R. § 438.206(c) (2).
102. Medicaid Program; Medicaid Managed Care, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,989 (June 14, 2002).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (2003).
104. See, e.g., EDWIN PARK & LEIGHTON KU, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
ADMINISTRATION MEDICAID AND SCHIP WAIVER POLICY ENCOURAGES STATES TO SCALE BACK
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never issued a written clarification stating that the obligation to ensure
equal access stems not only from federal Medicaid law but also from the
equality in treatment dimensions of civil rights law (i.e., Title VI) itself.
In sum, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which the major federal
health care financing agencies, and CMS in particular, have ignored Title
VI considerations in setting policy. Even where OCR has attempted to step
in to fill the breach, its efforts have had little effect since the delegation of
powers within HHS gives OCR no power to make program policy with
respect to health care financing. This enormous paradox- the assignment
of responsibility for enforcing federal civil rights laws applicable to federal
spending to an agency that has no powers to set the standards for federal
spending-results in a problem far worse than inaction. It effectively
excuses the very agencies with day-to-day responsibility to keep federal
spending in line with federal law. Even worse, this state of affairs
encourages willful ignorance of civil rights laws in the setting of
performance standards and in the establishment of procedures for
measuring compliance.
III. ALEXANDER V. SANDOVAL
In spite of the already-significant hurdles facing both private and
public Title VI enforcement, the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Alexander v. Sandoval 5 sent shockwaves through the civil rights
community."°5 By abrogating the right of individuals to bring private
BENEFITS SIGNIFICANTL AND INCREASE COST-Si IARING FOR LOW-INCOME BENEFICIARIES (2001),
available at http://iww.cbpp.org/8-1 5-Olhealth.htni (last visited Apr. 3, 2003); Bruce E.
Landon & Arnold M. Epstein, Quality Management Practices in Medicaid Managed Care: A
National Suroey of Medicaid and Commercial Health Plans Participating in the Medicaid Program,
282J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1769 (1999); Robert Pear, Many on Medicaid Lack DrTugs, Study Says,
N.Y. TrMES, Apr. 9, 2002, at A20.
105. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
106. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Two Supreme Court Rulings
Expand Police Powers and Limit Civil Rights Enforcement (Apr. 24, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n042401c.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) ("In one fell
swoop, the Court has both increased the potential for racial profiling and diminished 30
years of civil rights law designed to protect victims of discrimination."); Press Release,
Progressive Coalition for Equal Opportunity andJustice, Supreme Court Decision on
English-Only Law a Blow to Civil Rights and Women of Color (Apr. 24, 2001), available at
http://iwww.civilrights.org/library/detail.cfm?id=4892 (last visited Apr. 8, 2003) (noting
that Sandoval represented "a major set back [sic] for those who want to combat
discrimination in this country," and that the "decision has troubling implications for our
civil rights laws in many areas").
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actions under Title VI to enforce the disparate impact regulations, the
decision effectively wiped out two decades of Title VI litigation. 0 7 While the
decision left unanswered the question of whether a private right of action
could be pursued under alternative legal theories in the case of public
agencies," ' it eviscerated actions against private entities that receive federal
funds, ° which in the case of health care is an enormous matter.
The Sandoval case began life as a relatively routine (in the sense that it
typified Title VI cases) class action. The lawsuit was filed in December 1996
by non-English-speaking residents of Alabama, who claimed that the state's
Department of Public Safety discriminated against them on the basis of
national origin by refusing to offer drivers' licensing exams in any
language other than English. The plaintiffs alleged that although
Alabama's law was facially neutral-it did not explicitly prohibit non-
English-speaking individuals from taking the licensing exam and therefore
was not intentionally discriminatory-its effect was to discriminate against
those individuals who hailed from countries where English was not spoken.
Because the claim was one of discriminatory impact, it arose under the
federal regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI rather than under
the statute itself (since the statute proscribes only intentional
discrimination, while its implementing regulations prohibit conduct that is
neutral in motive but discriminatory in effect). After the District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama ruled that the English-only policy could not
be enforced,"" the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the decision."' The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari
to the Director of Alabama's Department of Public Safety.
107. As described supr, in note 53, every federal circuit court of appeals to address the
question in Sandoval concluded that a private right of action exists to enforce Title VI and
its regulations.
108. The Court did not reach the question of whether individuals could sue for Title Vi
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against anyone who,
acting under color of state law, causes deprivations of "rights ... secured by the
Constitution and laws." (In the wake of Sandoval, however, some lower federal courts have
ruled that plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 to enforce Title VI rights. See, e.g., Foster Children
Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (plaintiffs' § 1983 claim could not
survive Sandoval); South Camden v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir.
2001) (administrative regulation cannot create an interest enforceable under § 1983 unless
the interest is already implicit in the statute authorizing the regulation)). Thus, even if such
a suit were viable, only a portion of health care providers could be targeted under § 1983.
109, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
110. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
l1l. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (1 t " Cir. 1999).
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Writing for the narrowest of majorities, Justice Scalia maintained that
the text and structure of Title VI evidenced congressional intent to
separate the means of enforcement in cases of intentional and de facto
.... 112
discrimination. In particular, according to Scalia's reading, private
enforcement of Title VI is available only for intentional discrimination.
This reading is not obvious, however, given that Title VI makes no mention
of private enforcement whatsoever.
The majority achieved this legal sleight-of-hand by reasoning that since
the statute explicitly outlaws only intentional discrimination, the
regulations cannot be seen as an extension of Section 601. They must
instead be an extension of "the independent force"'1 s of Section 602, which
empowers federal administrative agencies to enforce the law through
regulations. Having located the prohibition against defacto discrimination
in Section 602, the Court holds that because this provision is limited to
ensuring agencies'ability to effectuate Section 601, Congress could not have
intended to include private enforcement rights as an option under Section
602. Justice Scalia argues that the plain language of Section 602 "focus [es]
neither on the individuals protected nor even the funding recipients being
regulated, but on the agencies that will do the regulating. ' m In sum,
Section 602's focus on the regulatory process, coupled with the absence of
explicit language creating a private right of action, was sufficient to satisfy
the Court that Congress intended no private right of enforcement.
The Court's decision brushes aside any analysis of the context in which
Title VI was enacted, declining with remarkable brevity the opportunity to
examine Title VI's legislative history because "legal context matters only to
the extent it clarifies text.""' In fact, in one of the more insulting passages
in any Court decision in recent memory, Justice Scalia frames the
argument of the individuals who brought the action in terms of a drunk
who has had one drink too many: "Respondents would have us revert in
this case to the understanding of private causes of action that held sway 40
years ago when Title VI was enacted.... Having sworn off the habit of
venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept respondents'
112. 532 U.S. at 287-88.
113. Id. at 286.
114. Id. at 289.
115. 532 U.S. at 288. For examples of the Court's willingness to rigorously consider legal
context in analyzing federal statutes, see Merill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353 (1981) (holding that Commodities Exchange Act provides implied right of
action) and Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding that Title VI creates
private right of action).
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invitation to have one last drink.""1 In effect, the Court took the position
that the entire history underlying congressional intent in enacting Title VI
did not matter to its interpretation of the statute.
The Court's treatment of precedent was no more deferential. In
considering the extensive Supreme Court case law in the area of civil rights
enforcement, the Court failed to apply the hypercritical scrutiny to which it
had subjected the text of Title VI, a failure for which it was roundly
criticized in the dissent.17 Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge that his
approach was ad hoc, however, insisting that the "Court is bound by
holdings, not language."1
The reasoning of the Court thus leaves persons who allege de facto
discrimination in the position of having legal protections but no effective
legal remedy other than the discretionary and grossly under-staffed federal
enforcement machinery. This outcome-that there can be individual legal
protections without adequate means of enforcement-is one that runs
counter to long-standing principles of statutory interpretation regarding
the existence of private rights of action.1 9 The Court's decision to remove
direct access to court as a remedy in de facto discrimination situations also
runs counter to the approach taken by every federal appeals court in
considering whether a private right of action exists to enforce regulations
issued pursuant to Title VI, including the disparate impact regulations. 2
116. 532 U.S. at 287
117. For example: "In a decision unfounded in our precedent and hostile to decades of
settled expectations, a majority of this Court carves out an important exception to the right
of private action long recognized under Title VI." Id. at 294 (Stevens,J, dissenting); "The
majority's statutory analysis does violence to both the text and the structure of Title VI." Id.
at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting); "In order to impose its own preferences as to the availability
ofjudicial remedies, the Court today adopts a methodology that blinds itself to important
evidence of congressional intent." Id. at 313 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
118. Id. at 282.
119. For example, it was not uncommon during the era of the Civil Rights Act's passage
for courts to hold that private rights of action existed even when Congress created a statute
with ambiguous or vague enforcement provisions (and, furthermore, to oftentimes do so
without performing a detailed analysis of the statute's enforcement provisions). See, e.g.,
Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. E. Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (implied right of action
under Motor Carrier Act); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of CongressionalIntent in Determining the Existence
of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 861 (1996). See also Donald H.
Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67
(2001).
120. For decisions so holding most explicitly, see, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484
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The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, assails the majority's holding as untenable, and
displays an antagonism reserved for the most contentious of the Court's
cases. Justice Stevens finds particular fault with three elements of the
majority opinion: its "muddled" account of prior Supreme Court Title VI
decisions, its "flawed and unconvincing" analysis related to the division of
Sections 601 and 602, and its misinterpretation of an earlier Title IX
decision key to the majority's opinion.1 21
Mainly, however, the dissent argues that although the statutory text of
Title VI might be narrower in scope than its implementing regulations,
there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended the statute to operate in
isolation from the regulations; indeed, the very link between the
prohibition of Section 601 and the assignment of standard-setting and
enforcement duties in Section 602 argues against such a result.
122
Reviewing the history of the Civil Rights Act, Justice Stevens notes that the
legislative design of Title VI countenanced a flexible approach to
combating discrimination. Indeed, the very fact that the statute specifically
instructs agencies to promulgate rules that effectuate legislative intent
underscores the validity of extending private rights of action to any class of
legal violation, not just certain types of misconduct. Specifically,
the statute does not establish a static approach but instead empowers the
relevant agencies to evaluate social circumstances to determine whether
there is a need for stronger measures. Such an approach builds into the
law flexibility, an ability to make nuanced assessments of complex social
realities, and an admirable willingness to credit the possibility of
12-3progress.
The dissent views the statute and regulations as "inseparably
(11th Cir. 1999); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 1999); Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S.
974 (1998); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Ferguson v.
Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001);
Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F,3d
481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996); NewYork Urban League, Inc. v. NewYork, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036
(2d Cir. 1995); Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774,
785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465 n.II (5th Cir, 1986); Larry
P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1986). No court of appeals has ever reached a
contrary conclusion.
121. 532 U.S. at 295 (StevensJ., dissenting).
122. Id. at 303 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
123. Id. at 306 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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intertwined" into a flexible and sensible remedial scheme to ensure that
recipients of federal aid do not discriminate against minorities, no matter
the type of discrimination.2 4 For this reason, the dissent finds it legally
implausible to differentiate between private actions to enforce Section 601
and private actions to enforce Section 602.25
In sum, the Sandoval decision is a case of enormous legal consequence,
and another in a series of Supreme Court cases that diverge from decades
of civil rights history in order to achieve a result that is consistent with the
modern Court's desire to withdraw the judicial system from disputes
involving the alleged abrogation of individual legal rights by government
actors.12 6 Because Title VI also reaches private conduct by recipients of
federal financial assistance, the case is of equal importance to instances in
which the alleged wrong is committed by a private entity.
Of course, at first blush, it might appear that the Court's withdrawal of
a private right of action to enforce the Title VI disparate treatment rule
would be of little consequence in a health care context, in light of the
relatively limited use of Title VI in the private health litigation context, the
rarity of victory when cases are mounted, and the potential advantages of a
strong federal enforcement presence."7 But this conclusion overlooks the
vital role that litigation-and the threat of litigation-has played in
bringing about change through negotiated settlements even when an
outright victory may not have been possible.128 Furthermore, as we have
124. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs, v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment's sovereign immunity protections bar individuals from suing states that failed
to provide disability accommodation). Furthermore, the Sandoval opinion evinces a
willingness of a majority of the Court to depart from long-standing tradition in another
context-that of broadly construing remedial civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) (holding that § 1983 is to be
broadly construed); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972)
(holding that the Fair Housing Act is to be broadly construed). This departure includes the
Court's efforts to obliterate implied private rights of action. See, for example, Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and its progeny. It is also worth noting that the decision may
also foreshadow a review of the validity of the disparate impact regulations themselves, since
the Court only assumes for purposes of deciding Sandoval that the regulations are valid. 532
U.S. at 525.
127. See discussion supra Part II.
128. For example, negotiations in hospital relocation cases such as Wilmington Gen. Hosp.
v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961) and Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) resulted
in crucial concessions over the establishment of satellite clinics, transportation to new
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seen,1n federal government enforcement capabilities where potential Title
VI health care violations are concerned are so devastatingly constrained
that it is difficult to overstate the futility of relying on the government to
do its job in its current state.'30 These facts could not have been lost on the
Sandoval majority, given the abundance of evidence from years of oversight
investigations into government civil rights enforcement efforts (or the lack
thereof) .1' This knowledge regarding the sorry state of affairs where civil
rights enforcement is concerned makes the decision all the more
unfortunate.1
32
Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority decision in Sandoval could
be read as abrogating all private actions involving the enforcement of any
congressionally sanctioned federal regulation that extends beyond the
literal text of its parent statute."" This approach to statutory interpretation
has no foundation in Supreme Court precedent but will likely be proffered
by institutional defendants in a wide range of subsequent litigation,
particularly in cases in which federal enforcement machinery is inadequate
(see supra Part II) and the withdrawal of individual actions realistically
means the denial of any remedy at all.
In fact, just two years after being handed down, Sandovals impact on
civil rights litigation generally serves as a harbinger of the systematic
deprivation of individual rights possible under the decision. Defendants in
pending civil rights litigation have asked federal courts to dismiss claims
and reconsider orders granting plaintiffs injunctive relief, and plaintiffs-
unable to remedy alleged disparate impact discrimination through Section
602 enforcement-have moved to amend complaints against public
defendants to add a Section 1983 claim. The Sandoval ruling has thus
limited not only the civil rights claims adjudicated under Title VI134 of the
facilities, and other changes.
129. See discussion supra Part 11.
130. SMITH, supra note 23; 2 UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 15, at 3, 29-30.
131. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CMIL RIGHTS, supra note 52.
132. See generally Lado, supra note 87.
133. See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(holding that Sandoval bars private enforcement of Title IX's anti-retaliation regulations,
since Congress intended Tide IX to be interpreted and enforced in the same manner as
Title VI).
134. South Camden v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001)
(using Sandoval as its guidepost and holding that an administrative regulation cannot create
an interest enforceable under § 1983 unless the interest is already implicit in the statute
authorizing the regulation); Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D.
Fla. 2001) (ruling that plaintiffs' § 1983 claim could not survive Sandoval, since holding that
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Civil Rights Act, but also those adjudicated under Title IX of that Act,8 5 the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),"'6 and the Rehabilitation Act.'37
Although a full review of the case law emanating from those claims is
beyond the scope of this Article, the results paint a disturbing picture.
IV. CONCLUSION
By eliminating the right of individuals to enforce their constitutional
protection against facially neutral practices that have a disproportionate
adverse impact, Sandoval inevitably focuses attention on the obligation of
government to address this type of systemic discrimination. Thus, as
sobering as the Sandoval decision is from a civil rights enforcement
standpoint, it conceivably could have a significant positive effect if it causes
policy makers to re-focus their attention on the role of federal
enforcement in ensuring civil rights.
But it should not have taken the rescission of an individual right of
action to incite a basic rethinking of the federal enforcement of civil rights
laws. It is evident from even a cursory reading of the original Title VI
disparate impact rules that they were aimed at preventing entire industries
and programs from operating without considering the racial consequences
of their conduct. This goal can upon occasion be reached through
individual litigation on behalf of classes of individuals. But the task of
forcing large interests to confront and remedy the racial harms that can
flow from facially neutral practices is surely best achieved through
the regulations are privately enforceable under § 1983 but not under § 602 would be
equivalent to holding that Congress intended the disparate impact regulations to be
enforceable against state actors, but not private entities).
135. Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that
Sandoval bars private enforcement of Title IX's anti-retaliation regulations, since Congress
intended Title IX to be interpreted and enforced in the same manner as Title VI); Atkinson
v. Lafayette Coll., No. 01-CV-2141, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *8 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 29, 2002)
(finding that in the wake of Sandoval there is no private right of action under Title IX to
enforce its anti-retaliation regulations). A question left open in these cases, and not decided
by the Supreme Court in Sandoval is whether an agency may enforce the regulations
against a state entity.
136. Access Living of Metro. Chicago v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 00-C0770, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6041 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2001) (ruling that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence
to rebut defendant's motion for summary judgment but noting that, in light of Sandoval,
plaintiffs would likely not have an enforceable disparate impact discrimination cause of
action under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
137. Id
31
Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum: Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
concerted action by government agencies which can use their spending
powers to generate systemic and structural changes.
To this end, it is inappropriate that the government assigns such an
important task to a small and isolated federal agency like OCR, which has
no day-to-day administrative authority over federal spending. Why should a
state agency or a major health enterprise listen to what this isolated entity
has to say, other than perhaps out of some abstract belief that federal civil
rights laws are important? Nothing in the daily grind of ensuring that one's
health care operations are in compliance with federal rules appears to tie
Title VI requirements to the basic operating standards that a health
program has to meet, particularly since the Title VI standards have never
been clearly articulated in a health context.
For both practical and political reasons, we believe that the primary
government tools for instigating deliberate efforts to achieve equality in
health care must be the same agencies that are empowered to shape
programs. As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, existing standards
applicable to the federal health insurance programs are rife with examples
of failures on the part of the federal government to view policy decisions
through a Title VI lens. Some decisions positively undermine the systemic
and structural goals of Title VI by inviting redlining, exclusion,
segregation, and other types of discriminatory treatment.
Using the response to the Olmstead decision (in which the Supreme
Court ruled that medically unjustifiable institutionalization of disabled
individuals under public programs constituted illegaldscrmiaton) 138 as
an example, we believe that cross-agency commitment to civil rights
enforcement is essential if the federal government is to achieve results.
This cross-agency role begins with a clear statement from Congress that it is
no longer acceptable to assign the daily obligation to ensure compliance
with federal laws to a single weak and dysfunctional agency. Since (as David
Barton Smith so eloquently shows) it was congressional pressure in the
latter half of the 1960s that caused the diminution of enforcement
activity,"" an important first step in creating a new cross-agency
commitment to civil rights enforcement lies with the current Congress,
which should articulate an expectation that all agencies develop a viable
approach to compliance. In the case of HHS, this means that, in the rules
governing the agency's federal appropriation, there should be language
that makes clear that lawmakers anticipate a Department-wide strategy for
civil rights enforcement. Such a strategy would not be limited to
138. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
139. SMITH, supra note 23.
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investigation of individual cases but would extend also to the development
of prospective standards of conduct that guide programs and providers in
understanding how civil rights regulations apply in a health care context.
Given the magnitude of the problem, the most sensible approach for
the Department would be to follow the example that it set in Olmstead. In
the aftermath of that Supreme Court decision, HHS leadership convened
an interagency task force whose mandate went beyond figuring out ways to
monitor and measure compliance with the decision. The goal of the HHS-
wide working group in the case of Olmstead has been to move the world of
federally assisted programs closer to the community integration goals of
the Americans with Disabilities Act through a fundamental and systemic
examination of existing federal policies. This effort to identify and address
inadequate or flawed federal standards began with the Clinton
Administration but has flowered under the Bush Administration,
culminating in a series of policy statements, reports, technical assistance
efforts, and other activities aimed not only at effectuating change but also
at conveying the importance of change to recipients of federal funds1
4 0
A parallel effort is no less important in the case of Title VI. In the post-
Sandoval era especially, there is a need for a Department-wide effort that
examines every aspect of the standards governing federal financial
assistance to health programs and health care entities. In light of the
market-based nature of the American health care system, a Department-
wide review must focus on the basic mechanics of health care purchasing,
and in particular on the elements of purchasing that are intrinsic to any
transaction in health care today: market rules of entry (e.g., conditions of
initial participation or grant awards for health professions training
programs or biomedical research), contracting and performance standards
(e.g., quality improvement criteria), and payment standards. These basic
operating rules are precisely the type of "facially neutral" practices that can
have a disproportionate adverse impact on racially identifiable subgroups,
particularly in the case of practices that exclude or impede persons from
accessing Medicaid or low-income Medicare programs. Given that certain
systemic practices that are basic to structuring and operating the modern
healthcare enterprise are prone to fall with disproportionate weight on
groups that are correlated with race (e.g., Medicaid beneficiaries, low-
140. To be sure, disability rights advocates would take issue with an overly rosy picture of
the progress made to date, and many would argue that the progress has been too slow and
that successive administrations have not done enough to press for community integration
reform. But when one compares the federal government's response to Olnstead to its post-
Sandoval performance, the result is positively sobering.
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income Medicare beneficiaries), we believe that particularly strong
Departmental attention should be given to the features governing the
location and functioning of health care entities. We describe below the sorts
of questions HHS should consider in regulating these features:
1. Market entry:4' What basic standards should be in place in any health
care institution? In communities in which the Medicaid population is
disproportionately minority, should an entity that seeks to participate in
Medicare be expected to also participate in Medicaid? Should an entity be
able to subdivide markets to avoid service areas that are disproportionately
minority? Should Medicare+Choice entities be permitted to avoid certain
communities and, if so, on the basis of what evidence? What reasonable
alternatives must an entity seeking to control the extent of its market
(either geographically or by payer source) be obligated to consider? What
are the acceptable grounds for rejecting alternative and less potentially
discriminatory approaches?
2. Contracts with business partners: What showings must a federally
participating entity (whether a state agency or a private health care
corporation) be required to make about its contractual business partners?
Can an SCHIP agency do business with a health corporation that does not
participate in Medicaid? Can an SCHIP-participating managed care
organization contract with providers that refuse to treat Medicaid
beneficiaries, and if so, under what conditions? Can a Medicare+Choice
organization maintain contracts with providers that will not treat dually
enrolled Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries who need Medicaid to cover
compulsory cost-sharing? What data must business partners provide about
their conduct and practices?
3. Payments: What standards should apply to the payment practices of
both public agencies and federally assisted health care corporations and
entities? Should a state agency ever be able to pay at less than
demonstrably actuarially reasonable rates for managed care enrollment,
nursing home services, or physicians' services? If so, under what
circumstances? Should a health care corporation that participates in
federal programs be permitted to establish differential payment rates by
payer source?
4. Affirmative efforts to improve health quality for racially identifiable groups:
With the emphasis today on health care quality improvement and
dissemination, should agencies and entities that receive federal funding be
141. These are the standards that determine whether an entity can enter a health care
market at all (e.g, conditions of participation for Medicare-participating hospitals, nursing
facilities, managed care organizations, home health entities, and other providers).
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required to demonstrate that they pursue quality improvement activities
aimed at enhancing provider performance in the case of racially and
culturally distinct subgroups of patients, particularly in the area of clinical
decision-making practices? Should they be required -to incorporate into
their quality improvement strategies policies that reduce administrative
and linguistic barriers to care and enhance patients' knowledge of their
rights and roles in the care process?
5. Health professions training programs: Should recipients of federal
health professions training grants and awards be expected to demonstrate
evidence of active recruitment of minority candidates? 1 4 Should they be
required to show that their curriculum includes efforts to increase the
ability of health professionals to engage in appropriate treatment practices
for patients who are members of racial and ethnic minorities?
6. Biomedical research: Should grantees have to demonstrate affirmative
efforts to design clinical and other trials that test the impact of
interventions on members of distinct racial and ethnic minority groups?
Should recipients have to demonstrate an affirmative effort to include
members of racial and ethnic minority groups in clinical trials?
By considering these questions and beginning to articulate clearer
performance goals in a health context, and by inter-weaving Title VI
compliance into federal program participation and grant administration
standards, we believe three advantages could be gained. The first relates to
eliminating distinctions between program compliance and civil rights
compliance. The constitutional basis for Title VI (the Spending Clause)
means that an entity cannot participate in a federal program if it is not in
compliance with Title VI. By integrating the two sets of compliance
requirements (program compliance and civil rights compliance), the
government would erase the false distinction-and the ensuing
confusion-that has arisen over the past three decades and would make it
easier for the recipients of federal financial assistance to understand what
is expected of them.
The second reason to incorporate Title VI standards into general
program standards speaks to a basic reality that underlies the modern
effort to achieve racial equality in health care. Because of the
demographics of poverty, it is, as a practical matter, difficult to separate
conduct with an adverse impact on the poor and publicly insured from
racial discrimination. Incorporating Title VI compliance and health
program participation standards would obviate the need to distinguish
between income and race discrimination and allow federal agencies to
142. See UNEQUAL TREATIENT, supra note 15, app. B.
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focus instead on layered reforms that do not parse the problem to a non-
remediable point.
To appreciate the third advantage of incorporating Title VI
compliance into general program standards, one must consider the gravity
of a charge of racism. It is evident to those who are familiar with civil rights
efforts that there is no more painful conversation than one involving race
discrimination. Given the history and ugliness of racial discrimination in
health care, the topic is an electrifying one, and an accusation of racism is
especially painful in light of the strong fiduciary tradition that imbues
health professionals with the notion that they act solely in the interest of
their patients. The notion of "doing the right thing" is so basic to health
care that when the system is accused of not doing the right thing, the
results are extremely distressing.
We believe that by merging the legal basis of federal health care
standards to encompass both program performance and civil rights
compliance, the federal government could do much to transform the
discussion to one that is grounded in both quality and equality and to
simultaneously minimize the temptation to classify activities as
programmatic or racial in nature. Given the nexus between race and
income, federal standards that are grounded in both sets of concerns-i.e.,
program quality and racial equality-would be easier to grasp and accept.
Merged standards also would eliminate the pressure to distinguish between
race and income, at least on a prospective basis. Obviously, a legal action
alleging that a recipient of federal financial assistance violated Title VI
would continue to have to satisfy the elements of the claim, including the
ability to show a nexus between the conduct that is complained of and a
racially identifiable group. But our concern here is for prospective
standards that move the system forward, not for facilitating legal actions.
In general, it no longer makes sense to divide the world of
enforcement when the overall goal is the systemic improvement of
program performance. Regulations built on two sets of laws-one tied to
racial equality and the other to program performance and health quality-
would make clear that a particular practice is desirable not only because it
improves the racial equality of programs but also because it improves the
quality of health care for persons who are the intended beneficiaries of the
programs. By establishing both racial equality and program quality
improvement as two inextricably linked goals (a direction that finds strong
support in the IOM study),143 the federal government would immeasurably
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final step in a federal effort to move systematically on issues of civil rights
enforcement is compliance measurement. Clearly, if the government is to
set standards that are meant in part to reflect racial equality goals, it must
have a method for measuring compliance. Whether this is done through
routine program reporting, specialized studies and surveys, periodic self-
assessments of performance against a set of negotiated benchmarks, or
some other means, there must be a way of measuring results and reporting
on them. A whole industry that has grown up around benchmarking,
performance measurement, performance reporting, and performance
dissemination offers insights into the tools available for this type of
compliance effort. If the federal government and other health purchasers
can insist on accountability in health quality on the part of hospitals,
nursing homes, and even physicians in private practice, then it is difficult
to see why measures of racial justice in performance are any more
controversial. To be sure, there are an enormous number of technical
issues that arise in the development of a racial classification and reporting
system, 144 but these technical difficulties are no reason not to develop the
most feasible approach possible under technical constraints.
We have no illusion that upgrading federal involvement in civil rights
enforcement will be free.14' At the same time, the cost to the system of
unequal treatment is vast, as the IOM has demonstrated.1 4 Had the
Sandoval case not been decided in the way that it was, we could perhaps
continue to imagine that private actions are adequate to remedy the
144. For example, how would physician network accessibility be measured? How would
the government implement reforns aimed at making sure hospitals receiving graduate
medical education payments modified their practices to come into compliance with federal
regulations?
145. Nor would we agree, however, with the argument that health care financing is a
zero-sum game, such that resources directed toward new civil rights enforcement efforts in
health care would somehow draw on existing health care expenditures. Indeed, the country
has seemed quite willing over the past couple of decades to accept rather dramatic
spending increases in health care. According to the federal government, national health
expenditures have increased almost six-fold since 1980. See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, National Health Expenditure Table 1, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t.asp (last visited May 29, 2002). This
trend appears likely to continue, for example, in the form of a new prescription drug
program for Medicare beneficiaries. We would also argue that it is not clear that additional
enforcement efforts would drive up health care costs in real terms, since in the long run
efforts associated with increased access to care might actually reduce overall costs to the
health system.
146. See generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT, stupra note 1.5.
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problem of discrimination in health care. But Sandoval has put that
delusion to rest once and for all, and now the only remaining question is
whether the federal government will meet the challenge that has been
thrust upon it.
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